Introduction
Throughout history, we have struggled to determine how best to govern and maintain our societies. Many times religion has found a place in government by providing an enforceable framework of expected behaviors and laws to impose over citizens to create order in society.
In a county that separates church and state, the government attempts to not enact laws that are directly derived from any one religious ideology to avoid imposing religious codes onto citizens who choose to not abide by that particular religious code. In Iran the government has taken form as a theocracy, referred to as the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the state is ruled by Islamic laws handed down by the country's Shiite leadership.
The purpose of the essay is to examine the influence of Sharia 
Introduction:
Throughout the course of history, religion has played an undeniable role in the political structure of Iran, whether or be through deliberate inclusion or exclusion of religious policy. This has allowed religion to remain at the forefront of the Iranian political mind, as the historical significance of Islam's role in Iranian politics facilitated the integration of Shiism into the Iranian national identity. The social, political, and economic environment of contemporary Iran is inexplicably linked to Shiite Islam's influence on regimes throughout Iranian history, particularly in the 20th Century.
When examining the modern state of Iran, it is impossible to objectively evaluate politics without considering the role of religion. Consideration of religion throughout Iran's history has been constant, either through direct aversion or direct adherence to Shiite Islamic principles. By examining the interaction between 20th Century Iranian political regimes and religion, the important influence of religion in Iranian politics can be easily traced up to the present.
In order to demonstrate the development of the Shiite Islam as a continuously influential political force in Iran, this paper will examine: the origins of Shiite Islam in Iran, religion and politics in pre-1900 Iran, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) , the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) , the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941 -1979 The theory of the Imamate stems from Twelver Shi'ism, which follows the belief in twelve, "divinely-guided, infallible leaders" as the true successors of the Prophet Muhammad.
Shiite Islam is built around several central beliefs, such as:
Islam as a total way of life even during the Occultation of the Imam, paying great attention to Islamic social and political philosophy and jurisprudence, insisting on the necessity of establishing a religious government in the absence of the Imam, believing in the unity of the state and religion during the Occultation period, and emphasizing on the responsibility of Muslims to take preliminary steps toward the promised global just government of the Imam Mahdi. During the presence of the Imams, (632-874), the government operated under a strict Islamic leadership. After the Battle of Karbala, which resulted in the death of Imam Husayn ibn Ali and many of his supporters, the remaining Imams began a traditional of lessened political activism. This signified the beginning of the Great Occultation, a period marked by the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam Mahdi, and continues to up to present day (Keddie 7). This inspired the belief that in the absence of the Imam, is it the responsibility of loyal Muslims to establish an Islamic state, a belief that would perpetuate the consideration of Shiite Islam in later political regimes.
Religion & Politics in Pre-1900 Iran
In the centuries before Iran's most identifiable leaders came to power or the advent of Islam, Iran was ruled as the first Persian empire under the Achaemenid dynasty (BBC Iran Profile). This formidable empire was ambitious, building the grand city of Persepolis and attempting to conquer the Greeks (BBC Iran Profile). In approximately 330, the Persian Empire fell to the Greeks, who were led by Alexander the Great, and became part of the Greek Empire Zoroastrian church leaders held important roles, serving as "moral supporters of the kings and their policies" (Kheirabadi 6) . Following the Muslim conquest of Persia in 651, the Sasanian Empire came to an end and Zoroastrians became heavily persecuted. While the practice of Zoroastrianism did not disappear, it was widely discouraged and hidden as many grew to adopt Islam. After the establishment of Islamic rule in the 7th century, "Persian (Iranian) intellectuals played a major role in developing the Islamic civilization. They contributed to the development of many branches of Islamic learning such as theology, philosophy, literature, jurisprudence, medicine, science, history, and geography" (Kheirabadi 6 ). Islamic religious advisors became influential aids to Muslim kings as each Islamic dynasty would be aided members of the Islamic Caliphate. Members of the Caliphate advocated for further Arab conquest in the region, promotion of Islamic principles, and helped to enforce the Islamization of Persia.
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Yet religious dominance did not always coincide with political dominance, from the 9th century until the 13th century the political influence of Islamic Caliphate declined and was replaced with a series of independent Turkish dynasties. In the early 12th century, Genghis Khan captured the country establishing a Mongol dynasty in Persia (BBC Iran Profile). Until the 15th century competing Iranian, Turkic and Mongol dynasties attempted to gain full power over Iran and its surrounding territories, making it harder for the Caliphate to ally with any one regime (BBC Iran Profile). Eventually a traditional Islamic ruler regained power in 1501, Shah Ismail I of the Safavid dynasty, who declared Shiite Islam the state religion and reinstated the importance of the Caliphate (BBC Iran Profile). During the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736), a dynasty which is widely considered to be the beginning to modern Iranian history, Safavid leaders "managed their government as a semi-theocracy… kings considered themselves spiritual rulers as well as political" but are remembered primarily for, "the emergence of a unified national consciousness" (Kheirabadi 6 ).
The Safavid had strong relationships with wealthy merchants and members of the religious leaders that composed the ulama, the regime was successful in re-establishing Persia as an economic force in the region, employed a system of checks and balances alongside their religious government, and supported development of the agriculture field. In the later years of the otherwise strong regime, the Safavid struggled to maintain their military leverage over surrounding tribes and eventually would lose their power to a series of short lived regimes before the establishment of the Zand dynasty (1751-1794). The Zand state was militarily weak, losing crucial Safavid land gains to the Ottomans, however Zand rulers managed to maintain relative peace, steady economic growth, and made attempts to appeal to their subjects and not operate as absolute monarchs like the Safavid.
In 1794, Mohammad Khan Qajar was instrumental in deposing the last Zand Shah, and established the Qajar dynasty (BBC Iran Profile). The Qajar dynasty started the Westernized modernization of Iran, and was commonly meet with scorn due to their embarrassing loss of territory to Russia and concession of economic power to Great Britain. Additionally, the Qajars "referred to themselves as the shadow of God on earth" and maintained absolute power by building up a strong support network of Shiite religious leaders used to "further legitimize their rule over their subjects" (Kheirabadi 6 ).
In the 1890's, due to a series of territory losses, Nasir al-Din Shah made a series of trade concessions to European powers. These concessions only served to worsen the economic welfare of the state and contributed to the widely held belief that the Qajars did not care about their subjects, and the Qajars relied greatly on the Russians and the British to maintain their rule.
However, conflict between Nasir al-Din Shah and the public came of a head in 1890 when the Shah granted a tobacco concession that gave a Britain army major a "full monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco for fifty years" (Kiddie 61 ). This concession was extremely detrimental to Iranian tobacco farmers and workers by endangering job security and undercutting their profits, but enraged all Iranians who wanted foreign power kept out of Iranian political affairs.
In 1891 protests against the tobacco concession began in major Iranian cities. At first, it was primarily bazaaris, merchants, workers and farmers directly involved in the tobacco industry that protested the concession, however the ulama also got involved in the tobacco protests. While the latter were motivated to protect their livelihood, the ulama was concerned with protecting Iranian interests from foreign domination due to their belief that such concessions were dangerous under the control of non-Muslim foreigners, as the ulama was concerned that Islamic tradition under foreign power would deteriorate (Kiddie 61) . The ulama lead protests beginning in Tabriz that eventually spread to Mashhad, Isfahan, Tehran, and beyond (Kiddie 61) . In late 1891, the protests came to a head in the form of a successful nationwide tobacco boycott that lead to a suspension of the concession's operation in some cities (Kiddie 61) . Unfortunately, at a protest in Tehran the government opened fire on a unarmed crowd, sparking further protest and by 1892 the concession was suspended indefinitely by the Shah's government. The consequence of canceling the concession left Iran with a large debt to the British Imperial Bank, however one positive effect of the tobacco protest was that it was, "the first successful mass protest in modern Iran, combining the ulama , modernists, merchants, and ordinary townspeople in a coordinated move against government policy" (Kiddie 62 ). This marriage between the power of the bazaaris, the ulama , modernists, and secularists reformers would continue to be important as Iran entered a new century (Kiddie 62) .
The Constitutional Revolution (1905-1921)
As the 20th century approached, Iranians began to voice opposition against the Qajars concerning their "arbitrary" royal power, corruption, extravagance, and tendency to let foreign powers interfere in Iran's state affairs (BBC Iran Profile). Advocates of the revolution were primarily wealthy merchants, the religious ulama , disenfranchised Iranian citizens, and radical reformers from various schools of thought (BBC Iran Profile). The "economic and political dislocations" that the Iranian people endured as a result of Western encroachment had great Langford 9 influence on kindling the Constitutional Revolution (Kiddie 58) . Iranian merchants and works struggled to compete with cheap European exports or afford to purchase pricey European imports, as Iranians struggle to establish operational factories and the international value of silver, the standard of Iranian currency dropped. This resulted in, "growing economic discontents and resentment against European rivals" (Keddie 58). While some groups enjoyed moderate benefits of trade with European powers, many merchants and laborers who traveled outside Iran "could witness reforms and hear liberal or radical ideas suggesting ways that governments could change and could undertake self-strengthening policies of a kind that might better Iran's condition and free it from foreign control"(Keddie 58). In addition, the ulama reasserted their resistance against "the alarming trend" of Iran's trade activities with European nations, transactions in which it seemed Iran always lost more than was to be gained (Keddie 59). As Reza Shah begun to exercise his newfound power, "a number of major changes in Iran's economy and society, despite a formal retention of the constitution and the Majles elections, decision making was increasingly monopolized by the Shah" as "the Majles became a rubber stamp and the constitution was paid lip service only" (Kiddie 88) . In 1931, the Shah passed a law outlawing Communist and Socialist propaganda, creating effective censorship laws created an environment in which "only official nationalism stressing national homogeneity, anticlericalism, modernity, and strength" derived from the pre-Islamic history of Iran could Langford 13 "flourish" . This marks a critical point in the development of the Shah's government as an adversist regime, working to systematically remove old vestiges of Shiite Islam from the Iranian political structure.
Reza Shah agreed to involve five Islamic clerics that would "be involved in government decision making to ensure that the government functioned within the Islamic context"(Kheirabadi 7). This agreement was quickly abandoned in order to give way to modernity as Reza Shah "considered Islamic traditions an impediment" to Iran's potential for advancement (Kheirabadi 7) . This lead to religion being replaced with secularism in hopes of quick Western modernization. Reza Shah was successful in "secularizing the Iranian legal system, education, and bureaucracy" and limiting the influence of the Islamic clergy (Khetibadi 7). Reza Shah focused on the creation a strong Iranian army, unity between ethnic groups, expansion of education, establishment a railroad network, and the development of the University of Tehran (Kheirabadi 7 ). Yet in pursuit of modernity Reza Shah also took some unforeseen missteps that did not help him curry the favor of the Iranian people.
Between 1925 and 1930, Reza Shah laid the groundwork for a series of overhaul reforms, all on which were incorporate in favor of Western modernity and not Islamic tradition (Kiddie 89) . High taxes were imposed on tea and sugar to pay for a national railroad, a new uniform land tax was established, and a large portion of government spending shifted to the strength of the Iranian military, which Reza Shah would routinely use in to order to exert control (Kiddie 89).
As the government became more centralized, Tehran experienced a surge of urbanization and the streets were abuzz with ideas, many of which could not be freely spoken of due to government censorship (Kiddie 89) . Additionally, a series of legal reforms were handed down, some of Langford 14 which reduced the influence of the Islamic clerics in the judicial branches of government in favor of a "modern, non-clerical judiciary and a uniform, centrally controlled legal system". Under Reza Shah, "the state took numerous measures to weaken the clergy,taking away most of their role in lawand education", thus further decreasing the touch of Islamic values in government and the day to day lives of Iranian citizens .
While these changes were considered positive by the Shah's supporters, they were put into effect alongside a strong oppression toward traditional Islamic practice. In pursuit of a rapidly modernized Iran, Reza Shah was cruel to traditional Muslims which would only breed issues for his regime. While previous monarchs relied heavily on legitimacy handed down by the support of the ulama, Reza Shah turned away turned away from this tradition and worked to keep Islamic influence far away from issues of the state. Despite the existence of the Majles , Reza Shah functioned with a dictatorial level of automatomy, often stating that "every country has its own ruling system and ours is a one man system"(Keddie 60).
In the 1930's, Reza Shah would have to compromise his ambitious goals for Iran's economy with the occurrence of the Great Depression. The depression would cause demand for Iran's trade wares to drop, and thus the need arose to suppress a series of rural uprisings as discontent grew (Kiddie 92) . In order to cope with this issue, the state embarked on a program of (Milani 3) . From this revival came elaborate celebrations and art festivals that did little to pay homage to Islamic influence on Persian tradition (Milani 3) . Perhaps the most significant of these festivals was the series set to celebrate the 2,500 Years of the Persian empire, dedicated to Persepolis, the old capital. The intention of these festivals was to pay homage to Iran's Persian history and celebrate the current achievements of the country.
However, the festivals were not open to the general public and became yet another source of controversy for the Pahlavi regime.
Policy changes that impacted the urbanization and the agricultural sector also came to Iran under Pahlavi rule. While the Shah did want to boost up the agricultural industry, he also wanted to increase trade relations between the West and Iran, promoting Western business expansion in the region . These changes in policy did little to help the farming dependent, lower class members of Iranian society, but they did a lot to strengthen the Shah's relationships with political elites and foreign business interests.While a small number of peasants benefiting from agricultural reform, generally the policies were not executed well enough to result in widespread success (Kiddie 152) . In reviewing this history, it is important to note how these political occurrences pushed Iran toward the 1979 revolution.
However, the Shah failed to realize that Iranian society would not tolerate the impressive economic development" once they come to realize that the "gifts" they had been given are really just basic rights, except Iranians only get them when they do not voice any opposition to a repressive regime (Milani 6) . Despite economic and social modernity, there was no democracy, which seeded social and cultural discontent. Concerning the Shah's festivals, some Muslim conservatives interpreted the reorientation towards focusing on Persian history minus Islam as a direct attack on traditional Islamic values (Milani 6) . Later some extremist went as far as pushing to destroy the site at Persepolis and banishing the existence of the site to a state of Jahiliyyah (Milani 5 But it must be understood that not only did Khomeini state that he would never seek a role in the government after the overthrow of the Shah's regime, but he also never disclosed his true ideological intentions to the whole of his supporters:
The only concern that Khomeini added to the nationalist demands was the government's violation of Islamic principles. He steadfastly maintained that an Islamic government would guarantee national independence and provide political freedom for all Iranians. In the final weeks of the revolutionary conflicts, Khomeini repeatedly declared that independence and freedom would be the essence of any Islamic republic. (Parsa 2) Given this, it would be difficult to argue that the Iranian Revolution was purely motivated by a desire to establish to Islamic state. While many Iranians had issues with the Shah's government, not everyone fought for freedom on religious grounds nor did they want to establish a wholly religious state, "while it is true that segments of Iranian intellectuals and students fought for an Islamic government, the majority of them did not fight for a theocracy.. Since the establishment of Islam as the ruling doctrine of Iran during seventh century, women have had, "little power over their sexual, psychological and emotional lives" (Farzaneh 206) . During the early years of Islamic influence, employment opportunities for women were limited by strict gender segregation and women we viewed as an objects that existed largely to Langford 24 service male sexual desires (Farzaneh 207) . As Quranic rules were implemented, male dominance was promoted and women were viewed as being lower than men (Farzaneh 207) .
During the Qajar Dynasty, the Constitutional Revolution inspired Iranian women to challenge female oppression for the first time in centuries. Women took part in political protests, fighting for the right to vote, forming women's organizations and launching a direct attack against patriarchal Islamic rules (Farzaneh 208) . Prior to the Constitutional Revolution, the rights of the Iranian women closely mirrored their status today; they could only could leave the house with the permission of a male family member wearing the chador, they were not permitted in some public spaces and there were widely "regarded as mindless" in accordance with Islamic principle (Farzaneh 209) . Despite their best efforts, even after the Constitutional Revolution women, "still counted as criminals and retarded individuals" as many contended that, "God did not give women the ability to vote" because, "women's brains lack the capacity to deal with serious matters" (Farzaneh 209) . During World War I, Iranian women wanted to take part in the war effort as other women did in Western countries, but they were rebuffed and confined to traditional duties (Farzaneh 209) .
During the Pahlavi Dynasty, under the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, "rapid removal of social taboos and restrictions that had enslaved women for centuries" begin to weaken Islamic elites. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi later implemented more secular women's rights, such as the right to vote, the right to hold important political offices, preside as judges, and pursue higher education (Farzaneh 216) . Another important example of pro-women legislation from the Pahlavi era is the Family Protection Law, which raised the legal marriage age for women, gave women more pathways to pursue divorce, gave women greater chance at gaining child custody, Langford 25 and made it so a man could only have two wives with the express permission of the court or his first wife (Farzaneh 216) . Mohammad Reza Shah's regime encouraged women to embrace Western culture, there was less pressure to many young and have many children, the motto Iranians took to concerning family planning was, "two children is enough" (Mohammad et al 2014) . This new license to modern womanhood under the Shah, while not perfectly equal, still signified a huge step forward toward modernity and equality for the average Iranian woman.
However, after the 1979 Revolution, many women found that "the long history of patriarchal Islamic traditions returned with a vengeance" (Farzaneh 216 ). Women were instrumental in the success of the 1979 Revolution by taking part in demonstrations and Ayatollah Khomeini promised women new rights if the revolution was successful (Farzaneh 217) . Khomeini believed that women's participation in politics should be used in favor of Islam and the ideal Muslim woman would be one that could, "accomplish all her traditional duties and also be aware of her social responsibility" to Islam (Farzaneh 218) . Almost immediately after the Islamic state was established, the Family Protection Law was repealed because it interfered with men's rights and was thus against Islam. The repeal of this policy lowered the legal marriage age for females to 9 (later changed to 13), and took away nearly every legal pathway a woman had to initiate divorce, maintain custodial rights, or receive alimony. Additionally, "the Islamization of state and society established both sex segregation and the mandatory hijab" which helped to enforce a "culture of chastity" (Farzaneh 220 ). According to Delaram Farzaneh, author of "One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back" :
Compulsory hijab is one of the most instructive discriminations against women's fundamental human rights in Iran…[it] not only discriminates against women, but Langford 26 also explicitly violates women's right to freedom of expression, thoughts, speech, and conscience… [an] imposition that reaffirms gender inequality and suppression. (222) The requirement that all women wear hijab in public spaces or be subject to punishment, restricts women's rights to expressionism which violates Articles 3 and 26 of the ICCPR and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Farzaneh 222) . Limitations on education for women also reinforces inequality. At the university level, women are only allowed to study certain subjects and there are quotas on the number of women that can study hard sciences and mathematics. The Iranian Parliament has stated that these limitations stem from the belief that, "some fields are not suitable for women's nature" and gender-segregated classes necessary "for balance" (Farzaneh 234 ). Despite a constitutional guarantee of equality for women, the Islamic interpretation of what a women's role is and how women should service society limits these rights from being fully actualized. Built-in gender inequality and violence against those who resist oppressive laws coupled with increased discrimination against women is justified as being divinely derived from Islamic principle and facilitates the perpetuation male dominance in Iran:
Whether it is the language of game and the constant denial of discrimination against women carved in the Iranian legal system; using the physical and emotional differences between women and men (Islamic principal) as valid justification for treating women in front of the world; or using explicit declarations of a male gender requirement for decision-making judiciary positions such as judgeship results in Iranian women's social, political and legal rights being systematically violated and hey are treated as second-class citizens. (237) In Iran today, little has changed for women as,"gender issues are hidden under the guise of Islamic ideology" (Mohammadi 2). The Iranian Constitution states that the family is the essential building block of society and that a woman's most important duty is serving in her role as a mother, as motherhood is undeniable right for women. The societal expectation that a woman is responsible for building strong Iranian family limits a woman's ability to participate in the world outside the home. Women cannot work, divorce, or travel without permission from a male. Women cannot obtain custody for their children and can be legally married at the age of 13. Women have no personal access to contraceptives to prevent pregnancies that may limit their opportunity to seek out employment and education. Women have no recourse for abuse or rape, endure gender segregation and state-sponsored, gender biased dress code. Women cannot partake in the armed forces or sing over radio or recording medium. Girls 9 or older can be held criminally responsible, while women are banned from decision making roles. Perhaps the most Langford 28 damaging idea for women in Iran is the idea that a woman with a public role is morally corrupt and lacking chastity (Mohammadi 3).
Considering the struggle of Iranian women to express themselves freely, make the their own decisions, get a job, receive uncensored education, hold a influential position, and simply attain the basic equality promised in their country's constitution, it is not hard see why gender relations in Iran are a controversial topic--because men and women in Iran do not enjoy the same human rights. Despite an equality guarantee for women, the Islamic interpretation of women's rights creates built-in gender inequality. Almost immediately after the Islamic state was established, the Family Protection Law was repealed because it was interpreted as infringing upon men's rights and thus against Islam. In the Islamic Republic of Iran today, little has changed for women as,"gender issues are hidden under the guise of Islamic ideology" how important Shi'ism is in Iran, stating that the primary function of religiosity "is a reflection of power struggles between economic classes" and that "religious practices and ideologies are a reflection of the material powers that drive and regulate social orders" (Mishal et al 5). These three authors are connected by their mutual belief in a "high-ground approach to religion" which involves a more nuanced understanding of "psychological processes, economic forces, and historical narratives" (Mishal et al 5) . This contrasts with the authors argument that the Islamic state of Iran exists in a middle ground state, which still puts emphasis on the role of psychological, economic and historical factors and how they shape reality but "the boundaries of the middle ground are solidy defined by unimpeachable truths" (Mishal et al 6). The authors describe one of these "unimpeachable truths" is the "faith in God as sole sovereign, rather than the state or the people" (Mishal et al 6). The middle ground that the authors propose, that they argue Iran has been progressively inching towards, "resits the ultimate satisfactions of absolute truths just as it acknowledges and is inspired by such truths" (Mishal et al 6).
The authors argue that the middle ground developed from the "void, interpretation, and friction" (Mishal et al). The void refers to the state of Islamic thought in the absence of the Imam (Mishal et al 6). Interpretation refers to "the main practice of Shiite community" and friction refers to "the practical axis of the Shiite middle ground" (Mishal et al 7). These are concepts that are central to the arguments that Mishal and Goldberg will build upon later in the book.
For example, the authors argue that the design of the Iranian constitution is set up to to protect issues that fall within the middle ground. This works because the branches of government are arranged in a way that "ensures conflict between them" (Mishal et al 55). This friction serves as a distraction between different branches or groups while the elites come up with a way to cease the friction what still adheres to the values of the middle ground. But if this is not possible and because Allah is has exclusive "sovereignty and right to legislate", the government is designed to "introduce a third way, transforming exclusionary conflict into friction and a more desirable mode of action to challenge unsolvable issues (Mishal et al 56) . The Iranian government views "conflict as an anomaly" and is expertly designed to operate within a friction based system, (Mishal et al 56).
The authors argue that since the years after the 1979 Revolution when the current Islamic state was established, the critical function of the state has been to "promote Islamic solidarity"(Mishal et al 57). The leaders of the new state attempted to implementation a strict Islamic based state but they also attempt to pacify revolutaries with adoption of some policies that were initially promised. This helped to contribute to the balance of friction in Iran. This has resulted in Shi'ism becoming more and more entrenched in the definition of Iranian tradition, which has been successfully perpetuated through "three distinct strategic behavioral modestraditional, conformist, and revolutionary" (Mishal et al 58). The traditional mode concerns commonly held traditional ideals and behaviors within society and is most commonly associated with the communal space, the conformist mode relates to institutional space and is focused on adhering to the dominant thoughts and actions at a particular time in society, and lastly revolutionary mode is connected to the frontier and it is concerned with a desire to go against the present state and conformist ideals (Mishal et al 58). between parties in order to come up with a compromised third solution to problems so parties are generally aware that their goals will not be actualized exactly as they were imagined (Mishal et al 69). In summary:
An attempt on the part of one strategic mode to achieve dominance over the others is considered to be an anomaly. Effective leadership and middle ground reality gravitate toward a balance. (Mishal et al 70) In the case of Iran, the authors contend that one of them most successful examples of Iranian middle ground politics took place during the 2013 elections. While many Iranians did not accept the legitimacy of the elections, many ended up voting for the candidate that advocated for change from the inside of the government, which in turn would inspire a "return to equilibrium" In order to advance our understanding of the modern shape of Iran and the importance of Shiite Islam, it may be helpful to pursue further research more keenly focused on the development of the "two cultures" in Iran that widened the gap between Secularists and Traditionalists in Iran which were formed a result of Reza Shah's modernization reforms.
Alternately, more emphasis should be put on the influence of the Constitutional Revolution on Khomeini's motivate and direction in the establishment of the Islamic Republic which are still perluated today.
